operation. Both times, it was an operation that we, the ones who have to do it
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operation. Both times, it was an operation that we, the ones who have to do it,
knew could succeed. An operation on which the fate of three Israeli pilots
depends. One of whom we know personally, and have worked with. Now, again,
with no real reason, you’ve stopped us. I see this as a breach of trust.” When
neither Dado nor Motta replied, I went on: “I have to tell you openly. You can’t
possibly judge the situation on the ground. Only we can. And you’re behaving
as if you know. You can’t know from here. There was no reason for us not to
grab those officers. I don’t want to reach a point when I have to start thinking
about what to report back, or not report, just to make sure we’re free to
complete a mission that you ordered, after agreeing it was necessary for Israel.”
No one said anything for a few moments. I could see that Uzi, Mookie and
Bibi were shocked at having heard me speak in this way to three of the top
commanders of the armed forces. But I meant every word. If Sayeret Matkal
was to function as a special-forces unit, it needed to have the trust of those
who’d authorized an operation in the first place. It was Dado who finally
replied. Sort of. Trying to defuse the tension, he told us a joke from his Palmach
days. “There are two bulls who come into a field full of cows. A young one and
old one. The young one says to the old guy: let’s run over there to the far end of
the field, where the prettiest cow is, and we can fuck her. The old bull replies:
“No need to rush. Let’s go slowly, and fuck them all.”
I guess we were meant to be the young bulls.
I doubt Dado knew whether we’d get a third chance at the Syrian officers,
though I’m sure he hoped so. A week later, we got word there would be a final
inspection visit, to the central sector of the border area. Ordinarily, I would have
led the operation. Now, I made an exception. To Dado’s obvious surprise, I
decided to remain behind, in the command post. “A commander has to be in the
best place to ensure a mission is successfully completed,” I told him. “I’ve
come to the conclusion the only way I can do that is to be here with you.
Because the real bottleneck isn’t out there in the field. It’s here.”
I placed Yoni, who had just become my deputy, in overall command of the
two main teams: Uzi Dayan’s and another led by one of our most impressive
young officers, a kibbutznik named Danny Brunner. He reminded me a lot of
Nechemia Cohen: he spoke little, and softly, but once an operation began was
calm, clear minded and able to anticipate and avoid trouble before it
materialized. Two other teams, one led by Mookie Betzer and the other by Shai
Agmon, would act as blocking units, concealed half-a-mile on either side, once
the main force intercepted the convoy. We chose a spot across from the Israeli
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