Cite as 349 F.Supp.2d 765 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)

IN RE TERRORIST ATTACKS ON SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 805 Cite as 349 F.Supp.2d 765 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) within the state ....” N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(2) (McKinney 2002). Courts have defined “agent” to include a defendant’s co-conspirators “under certain circum- stances.” Chrysler Capital Corp. v. Cen- tury Power Corp., T78 F.Supp. 1260, 1266 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (citing Lehigh Valley In- dus., Inc. v. Byrenbaum, 389 F.Supp. 798, 806-07 (S.D.N.Y.1975), affd, 527 F.2d 87 (2d Cir.1975)). Thus, “acts committed in New York by the co-conspirator of an out- of-state defendant pursuant to a conspira- cy may subject the out-of-state defendant to jurisdiction under C.P.L.R. 302(a)(2).” Chrysler Capital Corp. 778 F.Supp. at 1266. [38-40] Plaintiffs are not required to establish the existence of a “formal agency relationship” between the Defendants and their putative co-conspirators. Daventree Lid. v. Republic of Azerbayan, 349 F.Supp.2d 736, at 759, 2004 WL 2997881, at *18 (S.D.N.Y.2004). Yet, “the bland assertion of conspiracy ... is insufficient to establish jurisdiction for the purposes of section 302(a)(2).” Lehigh Valley Indus. Inc., 527 F.2d at 93-94; Lamarr v. Klein, 35 A.D.2d 248, 315 N.Y.S.2d 695, 697-98 (st Dep’t 1970) (holding that conclusory statements about defendant’s role in con- spiracy were insufficient to establish juris- diction under the co-conspirator doctrine). To establish personal jurisdiction on a con- spiracy theory, Plaintiffs must make a pri- ma facie showing of conspiracy, allege spe- cific facts warranting the inference that the defendant was a member of the con- spiracy, and show that the defendant’s co- conspirator committed a tort in New York. Chrysler Capital Corp. 778 F.Supp. at 1266 (citing Singer v. Bell, 585 F.Supp. 300, 302 (S.D.N.Y.1984)). [41] “To plead a valid cause of action for conspiracy under New York law, a plaintiff must allege the primary tort and four elements: ‘(a) a corrupt agreement between two or more persons, (b) an overt act in furtherance of the agreement, (c) the parties’ intentional participation in the fur- therance of a plan or purpose, and (d) the resulting damage or injury.” Chrysler Capital Corp. T78 F.Supp. at 1267 (quoting Kashi v. Gratsos, 790 F.2d 1050, 1055 (2d Cir.1986)). To warrant the inference that a defendant was a member of the conspira- cy, Plaintiffs must show that “(a) the de- fendant had an awareness of the effects in New York of its activity; (b) the activity of the co-conspirators in New York was to the benefit of the out-of-state conspirators; and (c) the co-conspirators acting in New York acted ‘at the direction or under the control’ or ‘at the request of or on behalf of the out-of-state defendant.” Chrysler Capital Corp. 778 F.Supp. at 1268-69 (quoting Dixon v. Mack, 507 F.Supp. 345, 350 (S.D.N.Y.1980)). “Whether an alleged conspiracy ... ex- isted is ‘a mixed question of law and fact.’” Daventree, 349 F.Supp.2d 736, at 760, 2004 WL 2997881, at *19 (quoting Mario Valente Collezioni: Ltd. v. Confez- ont Semeraro Paolo, S.R.L., 264 F.3d 32, 36 (2d Cir.2001)). Accordingly, the Court cannot accept “conclusory assertions on those issues; instead it must resolve such questions based upon an independent ex- amination of the factual allegations while mindful of its duty to draw all factual inferences in plaintiffs’ favor.” Jd. (reject- ing conspiracy theory of personal jurisdic- tion without permitting jurisdictional dis- covery). [42] Plaintiffs claim that all Defen- dants in these actions conspired with the al Qaeda terrorists to perpetrate the attacks of September 11. See, eg., Ashton Com- plaint 1296; Federal Complaint 11 66, 72- 74. Without supporting factual allega- tions, such a statement is insufficient to establish an agency relationship. Lehigh Valley Indus. Inc., 527 F.2d at 93-94; Da- ventree, 349 F.Supp.2d 736 at 762-63, 2004 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_017870