that the show be banned. Radicals now have the upper hand in slowly
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that the show be banned. Radicals now have the upper hand in slowly
ending Turkey’s centuries-old drinking culture.
Or take the AKP’s new Kurdish policy. In an effort to expand its base
among Kurds before parliamentary elections next June, the party has
emphasized Islam as a common denominator between Kurds and
Turks, in order to undermine the secular Kurdish nationalist party.
The plan may well help the AKP win the elections. However, it will
also invite competition from religious radicals, such as the Kurdish
Hezbollah — a violent Sunni group not linked to the Lebanese Shiite
group of the same name. Kurdish Hezbollah boasts a wide grassroots
network in southeast Turkey.
Recently, Kurdish Hezbollah’s leadership, which had been
imprisoned since a crackdown in the late 1990s, was released due to a
legal loophole. The AKP’s emphasis on Islam may mean it helps
replace the secular-nationalist Kurdish movement with a religious-
nationalist one. Don’t be surprised if Kurdish Hezbollah begins
suggesting that neither the AKP nor Diyanet are “Muslim enough” to
represent Kurds.
Turkey’s shift is bad news for the United States and Europe. The
potential radicalization of the Turkish population is a pressing
concern, given that Turkey recently eliminated visa restrictions for
citizens of a number of Muslim countries — including Iran, Syria,
Jordan and Libya. The move will facilitate cross-fertilization among
radical groups in Turkey. Washington should start making
contingency plans now to deal with radicals who will challenge the
AKP’s cooperation with the United States, particularly in
Afghanistan.
Turkey’s emboldened radicals will also take issue with Ankara’s
European Union policy — as if Turkey’s EU accession plans did not
already face enough obstacles. Given the large number of Turkish
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