Deployment challenges are limiting sovereign
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Deployment challenges are limiting sovereign
ability to match targets
In previous reports, we observed sovereigns’ return
gaps, driven by low interest rates and challenging
targets for fixed income allocations. We have also
noted how appetite for alternatives has grown as
sovereigns seek greater returns from private markets.
In last year’s report, we demonstrated that high levels
of competition in infrastructure and private equity
were causing sovereigns to shift deployment of real
assets towards real estate.
Competition for infrastructure and private equity
deals has accelerated in 2016, with deployment
times increasing across alternative asset classes
(figure 4). While the growth in these times is small,
it is significant: sovereigns are increasingly dependent
on their alternative investments to generate yields,
however, growing levels of undeployed capital for
alternative investments are being held in cash and
money market funds, so that sovereigns can respond
quickly when real asset opportunities arise. These
highly liquid investments offer limited returns,
particularly in comparison to sovereign targets for
real asset investments, causing further growth in
the return gap.
Risk of fund withdrawals is slowing further
illiquid asset investment
The ability of sovereigns to respond to the return
gap is being limited by the increasing likelihood of
withdrawals. Over the past three years, governments
have responded to economic volatility by reducing
new funding to sovereigns and, in some cases,
drawing down from sovereign reserves, as seen
in figure 5.
While previously only liability sovereigns
experienced regular drawdown of funds (in the form
of outflows to beneficiaries), an increasing propensity
for government withdrawals is encouraging
investment and liquidity sovereigns to consider the
liquidity of their portfolio. Liquidity sovereigns were
comfortable in their ability to withdraw from their
portfolio at short notice, however, many sovereigns
stated that liquidity management was an entirely
new objective, with certain investment sovereigns
responding by creating tactical allocations to cash
and money market funds. This has led to conflicting
liquidity requirements: sovereigns have to manage
withdrawal risks by shortening time horizons while
simultaneously seeking to access illiquidity premia
to generate greater returns.
Fig 5. Expected new funding and cancelled investments (% AUM)
Sovereign sample Investment sovereigns
2015 2016 2017 2015 2016 2017
on 56 58 ] 10 10
Liability sovereigns
2015
17 20 2G 14 6 8 fe 14 13
New funding
i Cancelled investments
Liquidity sovereigns Development sovereigns
2016 2017 «2015 2016 2017 2015 2016 2017
Sample is based on sovereign investors and excludes central banks. Sample sizes shown in grey. Data is not weighted by AUM. Periods shown reflect past year new
funding/cancellations.
09
HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_026689
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