The President responded by suggesting we go to the Pentagon and talk in

The President responded by suggesting we go to the Pentagon and talk in greater detail about how, for both our countries’ benefit, that could be avoided. When we convened in Secretary Cheney’s office, I delivered the same message, but more forcefully. I felt it was essential not only to make it clear we serious about taking action, but that we had the military capability to do so. So I told Secretary Cheney and Colin what we were planning. I said we intended to launch a combined air and ground assault by an air-mobile force and our best paratroop units. At that point, Colin, who was clearly worried, suggested the two of us withdraw to speak “soldier to soldier.” We retreated to his office. Spreading out a map of western Iraq, I went into greater detail, explaining how we would remain in the Iraqi desert on a search-and-destroy mission against the mobile launchers. Colin stressed the efforts the Americans were making from the air, and the commitment they’d shown to Israel. Not only had they delivered the Patriots. They had allocated their best fighter jets, F-15E’s, to the task of taking out the Scuds. It helped that he and I had got to know and respect each other, so it wasn’t an all-out argument. But I reiterated that if the Scud attacks kept up, we would have to act. “We will act,” I said. For a few seconds, he said nothing. But as we headed back to join the others, he told me that only a few hours ago, he had briefed American commanders on an anti-Scud operation by “allied forces” like the one we were planning. “It will happen,” he assured me. “Within 48 hours.” That task fell to Britain’s SAS. The operation was almost exactly the same as the one we’d planned. A force of nearly 700 commandos was helicoptered in to Iraq’s western desert, equipped with Jeeps and Land Rovers, and anti-tank missiles and laser targeting capability. They were also able to call on attack helicopters and F-15 jets if necessary. The operation did not prove easy, quick, or entirely successful. The British troops blocked the main roads and patrolled them. But they did not find or destroy a single mobile launcher. They ended up in gun battles with Iraqi troops. The SAS lost something like two dozen men. Five were part of a group that got separated from the others and ended up freezing to death in the February cold. All of the men risked their lives, with incredible determination and bravery, in an operation to secure the safety of Israel’s civilian population. And I have no doubt that the outcome, like the plan, would have been almost identical if we had done it ourselves. And it did have an effect. As I’d told Prime Minister Shamir when briefing him on our attack plan, the very fact of a military presence on the ground made a dramatic difference. The number, accuracy and impact of the Scuds dropped off steeply. A few missiles kept coming, however. Since we did not yet have a 238 HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_028086