Minister. But fewer and fewer Israelis were enthusiastic about four more years of
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/ BARAK / 29
Minister. But fewer and fewer Israelis were enthusiastic about four more years of
Bibi. But I also was keen to convey the substance of what my premiership would
be about. Domestically, I spoke of the need to narrow gaps in education and
opportunity — particularly, though not only, the continuing disadvantage of many in
the Sephardi communities who had arrived in the early years of the state. | wanted
to try to build bridges between the secular and religious as well. My hope was to
begin to recreate the “One Israel” of my youth.
In terms of policy, I believed my primary job would be deliver “security and
peace” — in that order. I declared my commitment to continue, and build on, Oslo
and to make a new push in negotiations with Syria. Deliberately following the
model Philip Gould had used in Tony Blair’s election campaign, we also
distributed nearly a million copies of a six-point policy “pledge card”. It included a
promise to hold a referendum on any peace deal we reached with Syria or the
Palestinians, as well as several domestic policy pledges, including an end to
discrimination against Russian immigrants whose Jewish religious status had been
called into question.
Yet the most widely reported promise was that I would pull out all Israeli troops
from Lebanon within a year. I realized that even among those who knew that made
sense, voices would be raised both in the Knesset and the Aivra against
withdrawing. As with the Bar-Lev Line before the 1973 War, the longer the
“security zone” was in place, the more difficult that politicians had found it to say
it was a mistake. Yet it had now been there for nearly two decades. The main
argument for keeping it — that it protected the security of northern Israel — was
undermined by the fact that thousands of Katyusha rockets had been fired over it.
And in the low-grade war we were fighting against Hizbollah inside the security
zone, around 20 Israeli soldiers had been dying each and every year. When Id first
visited our positions in south Lebanon in the early 1980s, chatted with the troops
and asked them how they were doing, the invariable response was: we’re OK.
We’re just worried about our young kids back home. Now, those children were
manning the same outposts, facing the same danger, in a sliver of land on which
we had no claim, which we had no desire to hold, and which was, at best, of
questionable security value.
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