BREYER, J., dissenting

14 JAM v. INTERNATIONAL FINANCE CORP. BREYER, J., dissenting See H.R. Rep. No. 1208, at 1. That multilateralism is threatened if one nation alone, through application of its own liability rules (by nonexpert judges), can shape the policy choices or actions that an international organization believes it must take or refrain from taking. Yet that is the effect. of the majority’s interpretation. By restricting the immunity that international organizations enjoy, it “opens the door to divided decisions of the courts of differ- ent member states,” including U. 8. courts, “passing judg- ment on the rules, regulations, and decisions of the inter- national bodies.” Broadbent v. Organization of Am. States, 628 F. 2d 27, 35 (CADC 1980); cf. Singer, Jurisdictional Immunity of International Organizations: Human Rights and Functional Necessity Concerns, 36 Va. J. Intl L. 58, 63-64 (1995) (recognizing that “[i]t would be inappropriate for municipal courts to cut deep into the region of autono- mous decision-making authority of institutions such as the World Bank”). Many international organizations, fully aware of their moral (if not legal) obligations to prevent harm to others and to compensate individuals when they do cause harm, have sought to fulfill those obligations without compromis- ing their ability to operate effectively. Some, as I have said, waive their immunity in U.S. courts at least in part. And the D. C. Circuit, for nearly 40 years, has interpreted those waivers in a way that protects the organization against interference by any single state. See, e.g., Mendaro, 717 F. 2d, at 615. The D.C. Circuit allows a lawsuit to proceed when “insistence on immunity would actually prevent or hinder the organization from conduct- ing its activities.” J/d., at 617. Thus, a direct beneficiary of a World Bank loan can generally sue the Bank, because “the commercial reliability of the Bank’s direct loans ... would be significantly vitiated” if “beneficiaries were required to accept the Bank’s obligations without recourse to judicial process.” Id., at 618. Where, however, allowing HOUSE_OVERSIGHT_028572